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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
Cynthia Johnson Rerko*
Sander L. Esserman**
HERE were a number of interesting decisions attempting to define or
limit the broad and sometimes amorphous area of creditor and con-
sumer rights during the past year. This article highlights develop-
ments in the law relevant to Texas practitioners during the period of
December 1991 through November 1992. A large number of the significant
cases of the past year turn on statutory construction and the approaches
taken by various courts when they concluded that the statutes before them
were ambiguous.
A. BANKRUPTCY
The United States Supreme Court unanimously resolved the conflicts be-
tween the federal courts of appeals as well as state courts and clarified the
status of ERISA-qualified pension plans in connection with § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code in Patterson v. Shumate.' In Patterson, the Court held
that a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be excluded
from the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 Section 541 provides that the debtor's bankruptcy estate
is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property."
3
However, § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from property of the
estate "a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."'4
Shumate, the Chapter 7 debtor, contended that his interest in a pension
plan that satisfied all applicable requirements of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)5 was excluded from his estate under
§ 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court rejected Shumate's
contention, holding that the reference in § 541(c)(2) to "nonbankruptcy
law" did not include federal law, such as ERISA, but encompassed only
* B.A., B.B.A. Southern Methodist University; J.D. University of Texas; Associate,
Stutzman & Bromberg, A Professional Corporation.
** B.A. DePauw University; J.D. Southern Methodist University; Shareholder, Stutz-
man & Bromberg, A Professional Corporation.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
2. Id. at 2250.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).





Like the district court that decided Shumate, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit similarly concluded that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" in § 541(c)(2) refers to state spendthrift trust law and not to federal
statutes like ERISA. 7 The Fifth Circuit also held that the ERISA anti-alien-
ation provision is not "other federal law" which would support a debtor's
exemptions under § 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.8 However, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the Texas exemption for interests in pension
and profit sharing plans and individual retirement accounts9 was not pre-
empted by ERISA. 10 As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that an ERISA
pension plan could be claimed as exempt pursuant to § 522(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 1'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. 12
The Fourth Circuit had previously held that ERISA-qualified plans by defi-
nition include a non-alienation provision consistent with § 541(c)(2) which
requires a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest in a trust and
therefore constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 13 As a result, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that Shumate's interest in the ERISA-qualified
plan should be excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2). The Fourth Cir-
cuit declined consideration of whether, in the alternative, Shumate's interest
in the plan qualified for exemption under § 522(b). 14
In its decision, the Supreme Court continued adherence to its previously
enunciated "plain language of the statute" standard and stated that the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA was determinative.15 Thus,
the Court rejected the assertion that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" refers
exclusively to state law. 16 In doing so, the Court pointed out that the text of
§ 541 contains no such limitation on the phrase in question and that
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, Congress was clear in restricting applica-
6. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 406 (W.D. Va. 1988).
7. Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1991) (relying on In re
Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 577 (5th Cir. 1983)).
8. Heitkamp, 943 F.2d at 1445.
9. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
10. Heitkamp, 943 F. 2d at 1449-50. The court relied on ERISA § 514(d) and the conclu-
sion of the United States Supreme Court that § 514(d) ensures that ERISA does not impede
either (1) other federal laws or (2) state laws which implement and enforce these other federal
laws. Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
11. Heitkamp, 943 F.2d at 1449.
12. Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
13. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
14. Shumate, 943 F.2d at 365. Section 541(c)(2) sets forth an exclusion of what would
otherwise constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property
specified in either paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of subsection (b). Section 522(b)(1) refers the
debtor to a specific list contained in § 522(d), which permits a debtor to claim as exempt any
property that is exempt under federal law (other than § 522(d)), or state or local law. 11
U.S.C. § 522.
15. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246; see also Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199 (1991);
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
16. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246.
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ble law to state law when it chose to do so. 17 The Court concluded that a
plain reading of the statute incorporated any relevant nonbankruptcy law,
including a federal law such as ERISA.18
The Court then turned to an assessment of whether or not the anti-aliena-
tion provision contained in the ERISA-qualified plan of the debtor satisfied
the actual requirements of § 541 (c)(2). Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA requires
that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." 1 9 The Internal Revenue Code provision
which qualified the plan before the Court for favorable tax treatment states
that "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless
the plan of which such trust is part provides that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated."'20 Because Shumate's plan stated
that "[n]o benefit, right or interest" of any participant "shall be subject to
alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance or charge,
seizure, attachment or other legal, equitable or other process," the Court
concluded that the plan complied with the applicable requirements of ER-
ISA and the Internal Revenue Code.2 1
The Court relied on ERISA provisions with respect to duties of plan trust-
ees and fiduciaries22 and the ability to enjoin any act or practice which vio-
lates ERISA or the terms of any plan23 in holding that the plan restrictions
met the "enforceable" requirement of § 541(c)(2). 24
Petitioner asserted that the legislative history of § 541 indicated that Con-
gress did not intend to extend the exclusion of property of the estate under
§ 541(c)(2) to a debtor's interest in an ERISA plan. The Court held that the
"clarity of the statutory language at issue obviates the need for any such
inquiry,"' 25 but went on to examine the legislative records upon which the
petitioner relied. The Court did not discern any clearly expressed legislative
intent contrary to its plain reading of § 541(c)(2). 26
The petitioner also attempted to assert that the Court's construction of
17. Id. (citing I 1 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)(entity may be a debtor under Chapter 9 if authorized
"by State law"); I 1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (election of exemptions controlled by "the State law
that is applicable to the debtor"); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(a debt for alimony, maintenance, or
support determined "in accordance with State or territorial law" is not dischargeable); 11
U.S.C. § 903(1)("a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness" of munici-
palities is not binding on nonconsenting creditors)).
18. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2247.
19. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)).
20. Id. (citing Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)).
21. Id.
22. "Plan trustees or fiduciaries are required under ERISA to discharge their duties in
'accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.'" Patterson, 112 S. Ct.
at 2247 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(l)(D) (Supp. 11 1990)).
23. "A plan participant, beneficiary or fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor may file a civil
action to 'enjoin any act or practice' which violates ERISA or the terms of the plan." Patter-
son, 112 S. Ct. at 2247 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3)(5)); see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990) (enforcing ERISA's prohibition against assignment of pen-
sion benefits).





§ 541(c)(2) rendered § 522(d)(10)(E) superfluous. Petitioner reasoned that if
a debtor can exclude his entire interest in a pension plan under § 541(c)(2),
there is no need for the more narrow exemptions of § 522(d)(10). The
Court, in rebutting this assertion, observed that a debtor who chooses the
federal exemptions may exempt a broader category of interests than
§ 541(c)(2) excludes. 27 The Court referred to a number of interests under
pension plans which qualify for the § 522(d)(10) exemption, but which do
not qualify for the § 541(c)(2) exclusion. 28
Petitioner's final point was that the Court's conclusion frustrated the
Bankruptcy Code's policy of an expansive inclusion of assets in a bankruptcy
estate. The Court observed that petitioner was confusing a broad definition
with a broad policy, but that the argument was irrelevant given the clarity of
the statute.29 Nevertheless, the Court buttressed its conclusion by observing
that policy would be served because its holding would: (1) ensure that the
treatment of pension benefits would not vary based on the beneficiary's
bankruptcy status; (2) give full and appropriate effect to ERISA's goal of
protecting pension benefits; and (3) further uniform national treatment of
pension benefits and the underlying policy of ERISA.30
In another instance of strict statutory construction, the United States
Supreme Court held that even where the debtor had no legal basis for claim-
ing the exemption, the Chapter 7 trustee could not contest its validity after
the thirty-day objection period established by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) had
expired without the trustee having obtained any extension.31
Section 522(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor or a dependent of
the debtor to file a list of property that the debtor claims is exempt from
property of the estate. 32 In the case before the Court, the Chapter 7 debtor
had listed anticipated proceeds from an employment discrimination lawsuit
on the list of property claimed as exempt which she filed pursuant to§ 522(1). Section 522(1) specifies that "[u]nless a party in interest objects, the
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt."'33 Bankruptcy Rule
27. Id. (citing e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1)(2); 26 CFR 1.401(a)-13(a)(1991)(pension
plans established by governmental entities and churches need not comply with Subchapter I of
ERISA); 26 U.S.C. § 408 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6) (Supp. 11 1990) (IRA's are specifically
exempted from ERISA's anti-alienation requirement)).
28. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2248-49. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) states that the following
property may be exempted: (10) The debtor's right to receive -
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service,
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any depen-
dent of the debtor, unless - (i) such plan or contract was established by or under
the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's
rights under such plan or contract arose; (ii) such payment is on account of age
or length of service; and (iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under sec-
tion 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
29. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
30. Id. at 2249-50.
31. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1648-49 (1992).




4003(b) provides that "[t]he trustee or any creditor may file objections to the
list of property claimed as exempt within thirty days after the conclusion of
the meeting of creditors .. . unless, within such period, further time is
granted by the court."' 34
The Chapter 7 trustee did not object to the claimed exemption within the
thirty-day period. Later, upon discovering that the debtor had received ap-
proximately $110,000 in a settlement of the lawsuit, the trustee filed a com-
plaint against the debtor. The trustee asserted that since the debtor had no
legal basis for claiming the proceeds as exempt, the funds should be turned
over as property of the estate.
The Court rejected the trustee's argument that if the debtor did not have a
good faith or reasonably disputable basis for claiming the exemption, a court
may invalidate an exemption after the thirty-day period has expired. 35 In
refusing to imply a good faith or "colorably statutory basis" requirement in
§ 522(1), the Court specifically overruled a number of decisions of Courts of
Appeals, including one rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 36 The Court stated that "[d]eadlines may lead to unwel-
come results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality." 37
In Dewsnup v. Timm, 38 the United States Supreme Court held that where
the creditor's claim has been allowed, a Chapter 7 debtor may not utilize
§ 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to 'strip down,' or reduce, a creditor's lien
on real property to the current value of the property.39 Aletha Dewsnup
and her husband, T. LaMar Dewsnup, 40 debtors under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, initiated an adversary proceeding to determine the valid-
ity and extent of a note and deed of trust held on real property. Dewsnup
asserted that §§ 506(a) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code, when read to-
gether, required that the bankruptcy court void the lien on the property to
the extent that the lien amount exceeded the fair market value of the prop-
erty. Debt on the property was approximately $120,000. At the trial, the
bankruptcy court valued the property at $39,000. Section 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest, . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property,
•.. and an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such interest
is less than the amount of such allowed claim. 41
Section 506(d) states that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim
34. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. Rule 4003(b).
35. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648.
36. Id. (citing inter alia, In re Sherk, 918 F. 2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1990) (Section 522(1)
contains an implicit additional requirement that there be a statutory basis for the claimed
exemption before the failure of any party in interest to object timely has any legal effect)).
37. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648.
38. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
39. Id. at 778.
40. T. LaMar Dewsnup passed away sometime during these proceedings.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void."'42
As a result, the Dewsnups asserted that since under § 506(a), a claim is se-
cured only to the extent of the value of the property which secures the lien,
then under § 506(d), a lien on the property can be voided to the extent that a
claim is not secured and consequently not "an allowed secured claim." The
United States Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that if a cred-
itor's claim is secured by a lien, and has been allowed, then that claim can-
not be "not an allowed secured claim" for the purposes of § 506(d). 43
The Court asserted that Congress would not have used the Bankruptcy
Code to implement a major change in pre-Code practice without leaving
some clues in the record. The Court observed that where language of a stat-
ute is unambiguous, silence in legislative history does not control. However,
because of what it perceived to be ambiguity in the text of § 506, the Court
decided that in the absence of indicative legislative history, it must analyze
pre-Code practice. The Court reviewed cases decided under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, as well as post-Code cases discussing the Act and concluded
that with the exception of reorganization proceedings, "no pre-Code statute
permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a creditor's lien for any
reason other than payment on the debt.""4
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, dissented in an opinion which is
longer than that of the majority. He disagreed with the Court's conclusion
that the text of § 506 is ambiguous. 45 He observed that the Court has never
relied on pre-Code practice as a determinant in the face of contradictory
statutory text. Scalia asserted that when Congress has rewritten entire pro-
visions, regardless of whether pre-Code practice is retained or abandoned,
the text means exactly what it says. 46 According to Justice Scalia, § 506(d),
when "[r]ead naturally and in accordance with other provisions of the stat-
ute .... automatically voids a lien to the extent the claim it secures is not
both an "allowed claim" and a "secured claim" under the Code."'47
Scalia contrasted the Court's opinion with its opinion in United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises Inc. 48 and concluded that "[a]lmost point for point,
today's opinion is the methodological antithesis of Ron Pair - and I have the
greatest sympathy for the Courts of Appeals who must predict which man-
ner of statutory construction we shall use for the next Bankruptcy Code
case.
' 49
It is important to remember that the Court was interpreting § 506(d) in
the context of a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Yet,
42, 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
43. 112 S. Ct. at 778.
44. Id. at 779.
45. See 112 S. Ct. at 781, where Justice Scalia observed that the statute's characterization
by the Court as ambiguous was "a status apparently achieved by being the subject of disagree-
ment between self-interested litigants."
46. 112 S. Ct. at 787.
47. Id. at 780.
48. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
49. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 787.
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in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman), ° the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 1322(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits a debtor under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code from using Chapter 13 plan to bifurcate a mortgage lien claim on its
principal residence into a secured and unsecured claim.51 The circuit court
relied in part on the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Dew-
snup, as support for its view that bifurcation was impermissible.5 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, interpreting
§ 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 53 held that where an oversecured credi-
tor's claim arises from a contract, the contract rate dictates the rate at which
postpetition interest is payable.5 4 The court further held that whether the
default rate or the predefault rate should apply depends on the equities in-
volved in the bankruptcy proceeding."
The creditor filed a motion for payment of interest, costs and fees at the
eighteen percent default rate specified by the note, under § 506(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Although § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code proscribes
the allowance of postpetition interest against the estate, 56 § 506(b) provides
an exception where the value of the collateral which secures an allowed se-
cured claim is greater than the amount of the allowed claim.5 7 The bank-
ruptcy court originally determined that the creditor was entitled to
postpetition interest on its claim at the contract rate of ten percent. Upon
reconsideration, the bankruptcy court vacated its prior opinion and held that
the federal judgment interest rate was the proper rate of postpetition
interest.58
The bankruptcy 6ourt based its conclusion on the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. 59 In Ron
Pair, the Court was required to determine whether or not § 506(b) applies
only to claims arising under an agreement or to all oversecured claims
whether based on agreement or nonconsensual statutory liens. The Court
held that a statute's plain meaning should be the primary source for inter-
pretation and application of that statute and emphasized "[ft]he natural read-
50. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992).
51. Id. at 489. Section 1322(b)(2) provides that a Chapter 13 plan may: "(a) modify the
rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or
leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
52. 968 F.2d at 487.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) states:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest
on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose.
54. Bradford v. Crozier, 958 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. Id.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
58. In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (relying on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961).
59. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
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ing of the [relevant] phrase," and the "grammatical structure of the
statute." 6° Because the phrase "interest on such claim," is framed by com-
mas and separated by use of the conjunction "and" which precedes the
phrase which refers to "any reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for
under the agreement," the Court concluded that "interest on such claim"
encompasses consensual and nonconsensual claims. 61
In keeping with the United States Supreme Court's determination in Ron
Pair that the concept of "interest on such claim" was distinct from the exist-
ence of any agreement which provides the basis of a claim, the bankruptcy
court held that "the entire issue of interest is completely divorced from
either the existence or the content of any underlying agreement."'62 The
bankruptcy court held that since § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
hibits the recovery of contract interest postpetition, § 506(b) should not be
interpreted to give back what § 502(b)(2) takes away.63 The bankruptcy
court observed that an allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, is the
functional equivalent of a federal judgment against the estate's assets.64 As a
result, an oversecured creditor's federal judgment should accrue interest at
the federal judgment interest rate.65 The district court affirmed.
In reversing the lower courts' decisions, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that nothing in Ron Pair addressed the issue
of the applicable rate of interest under § 506(b). 66 Turning away from statu-
tory construction and relying on the pre-Code practice analysis utilized by
the United States Supreme Court in Dewsnup v. Timm, 67 the circuit court
determined that since the legislative history of § 506(b) was silent with re-
spect to a rate of interest, Congress had no intention of changing pre-Code
practice with respect to interest on oversecured claims.68 Relying on pre-
Code cases, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the contract rate of interest
should be utilized when granting an oversecured creditor postpetition inter-
est under § 506(b). 69
This decision seems inconsistent with the decision of the United States
60. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241.
61. Id. at 241-42.
62. Laymon, 117 B.R. at 859.
63. Id. at 863.
64. Id. at 864.
65. 117 B.R. at 864 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961).
66. Bradford, 958 F.2d at 74.
67. 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992).
68. Bradford, 958 F.2d at 74.
69. Id. at 75 (citing In re Sheppley & Co., 62 B.R. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (discuss-
ing the following pre-Code cases: Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S.
156 (1946); American Surety Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269 (1946); U.S. Trust Co. v. Zelle, 191
F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d
8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Black v. Strand, 385 U.S. 990 (1966); Ruskin v. Griffiths,
269 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 947 (1960)). By agreement of the parties,
the original motion for payment under I U.S.C. § 506(b) was withdrawn. During the pen-
dency of the proceedings, the value of the collateral diminished to a point where the over-
secured status of the creditor was uncertain. In addition, the trustee intends to propose a plan
of reorganization which treats the creditor's claim. (February 1, 1993 telephone conversation
with Stephen W. Sather, Overstreet, Winn & Edwards, counsel for James Crozier, trustee).
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Supreme Court in Ron Pair. The Ron Pair Court held that the plain mean-
ing of a statute, based on its language, should be conclusive unless literal
application of the statute will "produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intention of its drafters."'70 Only then should courts look to legislative
history and pre-Code practice.71 The Ron Pair Court concluded that, based
on the plain language of the statute, § 506(b) applies to claims based on
contract as well as involuntary claims such as those which arise from a judi-
cial or statutory lien.72 The bankruptcy court relied on this interpretation in
reaching its conclusions in Laymon.
The Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Bradford v. Crozier73 is based on an in-
terpretation of § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code that conflicts with the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that same statute. As a re-
sult, the Fifth Circuit leaves unanswered the question of what interest rate
should be applied under § 506(b) when the creditor's claim is not based on a
contract.
The bankruptcy court granted the request of the Official Unsecured Credi-
tor's Committee to equitably subordinate the claims of parties it concluded
were insiders of the debtor in Herby's Foods, Inc. v. Summit Coffee Co., Inc.
(In re Herby's Foods, Inc.). 74 In Herby's Foods, the parties agreed that the
company which owned 100 percent of the debtor's stock, the individual who
owned 100 percent of the voting securities of that company, and an individ-
ual who managed the debtor were all insiders of the debtor. As a result,
Judge Felsenthal held that their conduct was subject to a greater degree of
scrutiny. 75
Judge Felsenthal stated that equitable subordination allows a court to get
beyond the form of a transaction, examine its substance and change claim
priorities based upon the conduct of creditors.76 He then applied the three-
part test that has been enunciated repeatedly by the Fifth Circuit: "(i) the
claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (ii) the
misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (iii) equitable subordina-
tion of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bank-
70. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242.
71. Id. at 242-46.
72. Id. at 241.
73. 958 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1992).
74. 134 B.R. 207 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). The doctrine of equitable subordination is
incorporated in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(c)(1) and (2) which provide that a
court may -
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of dis-
tribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim
or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (c)(1) and (2).
75. Herby's Foods, 134 B.R. at 211 (citing Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc.
(In re Fabricators, Inc.), 126 B.R. 239, 246 (S.D. Miss. 1989), aff'd, In re Fabricators, Inc.,
926 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1991)).




The Herby's Foods case is interesting because Judge Felsenthal held that
undercapitalization constitutes a form of inequitable conduct. 78 Relying on
expert testimony and other evidence, Judge Felsenthal concluded that the
debtor was undercapitalized at the time the insiders acquired it and that the
capital infusions characterized as loans were, in fact, equity capital
contributions. 79
Observing that in some cases, in addition to undercapitalization, some ag-
gravating conduct may need to be found, the court held that the improper
characterization of the capital contributions as loans constituted aggravating
conduct.8 0 Also damning was the fact that the claimants did not perfect
their security interests until it became clear that the debtor was insolvent. 8'
The bankruptcy court held that these insiders' conduct harmed other
creditors of the debtor because characterizing their contributions as secured
debt increased other creditors' exposure and reduced their dividend in liqui-
dation.82 Importantly, the court observed that if these insider claims were
subordinated, the general unsecured claims could be paid in full.8 3 Judge
Felsenthal concluded that equitable subordination was consistent with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code because proper recharacterization of the
claimants' contributions as equity contributions, rather than loans, ensured
consistency with the absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code.84
The United State District Court for the Northern District Of Texas af-
firmed.8 5 The case is pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
B. EXEMPTIONS
In re Griffin,86 one of the first reported cases interpreting the amended
personal property exemptions, the bankruptcy court concluded that a sail-
boat may not be claimed exempt as "athletic and sporting equipment" under
§ 42.002(a)(8) of the Texas Property Code.8 7 Judge Ronald King observed
that prior to the May, 1991 amendments to the Texas Property Code,88 cer-
tain items of personal property, including athletic and sporting equipment,
77. Id. at 211 (citing In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Mobile
Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977)).
78. Herby's Foods, 134 B.R. at 211 (citing In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1467).
79. Herby's Foods, 134 B.R. at 212.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 212-13.
82. Id. at 213.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)).
85. Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc., No. 3:92-CV-01 189 (N.D. Tex. July 20,
1992).
86. 139 B.R. 415 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
87, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1993).




were exempt only if reasonably necessary for the family or single adult.8 9
Because Griffin had filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
after the effective date of the amendments, this subjective "reasonably neces-
sary" standard was not applicable and the sailboat was required only to fit
within the category of "athletic and sporting equipment." 90 The Griffin
court reviewed existing pre-amendment case law applying the sporting goods
exemption and decided that "athletic and sporting equipment" only in-
cludes small items for personal or individual use.9 1
In his analysis, Judge King relied heavily on an unreported 1989 opinion
in which Judge Leif Clark concluded that a bass boat was not exempt as
athletic sporting equipment.92 There, the bankruptcy court compared two
different exemptions of § 42.002 and decided that the legislature intended
that a boat be exempt only if it were used in a trade or profession. 93 The
Schwarzbach court held that with respect to the tools of trade exemption,
specification of a boat in the category of equipment was necessary because
"equipment" does not ordinarily connote boat. 94 Applying similar reason-
ing, the Griffin court observed that the legislature had specifically included
bicycles, but not boats in the category of "athletic and sporting
equipment." 95
C. FDIC
In FDIC v. Wright 96 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to
allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its capacity as receiver
of a failed financial institution (FDIC-as-Receiver), the protection available
under § 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, as a defense against a trustee's
avoidance of a preferential transfer pursuant to § 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code.97 The court held that FDIC-as-Receiver does not take "for value" as
89. Griffin, 139 B.R. at 416 (citing former TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(E)
(Vernon 1984), enacted as Act of May 26, 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 576, § I Tex. Gen. Laws 3475,
3523).
90. Griffin, 139 B.R. at 417 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.
1993)).
91. Griffin, 139 B.R. at 416 (relying on In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987)
(not subject to exemption if objection filed); In re Gibson, 69 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1987) (limited to small items for individual use); In re Schwarzbach, No. 87-30817 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. May 22, 1989) (Leif Clark, J.) (athletic and sporting equipment exemption is lim-
ited to small items for personal use)).
92. Griffin, 139 B.R. at 417, (citing Schwarzbach, supra note 88).
93. Schwarzbach, supra note 88 (comparing the former § 42.002(3)(B) which allowed an
exemption "if reasonably necessary for the family or single adult" for "tools, equipment, books
and apparatus, including a boat, used in a trade or profession," with former § 42.002(3)(E)
which allowed an exemption "if reasonably necessary for the family or single adult" for "ath-
letic and sporting equipment." Formerly TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(E) enacted as
Act of May 26, 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 576, § 1 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3523). The current
§ 42.002(a)(4) exemption refers to "boats and motor vehicles."
94. Schwarzbach, supra note 88.
95. Griffin, 139 B.R. at 417.
96. 963 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1992).
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Supp. 1992) allows a trustee to avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt
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required by § 550(b)(1). 98
In Wright, in order to enforce a guaranty, the First State Bank of Abilene
obtained a judgment against William H. Still in June, 1988. The bank ob-
tained a writ of garnishment against obligors of Still in July, 1988. Still filed
for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in August, 1988 and
the bank timely filed a proof of claim in the amount of $308,334. The bank
failed in February, 1989 and FDIC was appointed receiver.
Pursuant to § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Chapter 7 trustee avoided
the writs of garnishment. The bankruptcy court refused to permit FDIC's
attempts to gain the protection of § 550(b)(1) and allowed the Trustee's
avoidance of the garnishments.99 The district court affirmed.1°°
The trustee and FDIC-as-Receiver agreed that the garnishments consti-
tuted preferential transfers pursuant to § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The parties also agreed that if FDIC-as-Receiver were a transferee, it was a
transferee under § 550(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code because it received the
transfer from the initial transferee, the bank, when the bank went into re-
ceivership. Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a preferen-
tial transfer may be recovered from (1) the initial transferee or the party for
whose benefit the transfer was made, or (2) any immediate or mediate trans-
feree of the initial transferee.101
FDIC-as-Receiver argued that it was subject to the limits against recover-
ability set forth in § 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to
§ 550(b)(1), the trustee may not recover from an immediate or mediate
transferee if the transferee: (1) takes for value, including satisfaction or se-
curing of a present or antecedent debt; (2) in good faith; and (3) without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided.'0 2
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court and the district court
that FDIC-as-Receiver does not qualify for § 550(b)(1) protection because it
does not take "for value."' 03 FDIC-as-Receiver asserted that it takes "for
value" when it takes a failed bank's assets in two ways: (1) by assuming a
bank's liabilities, and (2) by performing its statutory duties. The circuit
court rejected both assertions.
owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor
was insolvent; (4) made - (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or (B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5)
that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if -
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not
been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
98. Wright, 963 F.2d at 78. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) provides that the trustee may not re-
cover from "a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or
antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
avoided."
99. Wright v. FDIC (In re Still), 113 B.R. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
100. FDIC v. Wright (In re Still), 124 B.R. 24 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1).
103. Wright, 963 F.2d at 77.
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The court observed that FDIC-as-Receiver did not pay cash or any other
property to the bank when it succeeded to the bank's assets. Although the
circuit court agreed with the FDIC that an assumption of liabilities consti-
tutes value, the court held that FDIC-as-Receiver does not actually assume
any liabilities.'04 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that FDIC-
as-Receiver is statutorily required to "pay valid obligations of the insured
depository institution in accordance with the prescriptions and limitations of
[FIRREA]." 05 The court further stated that under FIRREA, the "receiver
may in the receiver's discretion and to the extent funds are available, pay
creditor claims which are allowed by the receiver, approved by the
[FDIC]... or determined by the final judgment of any court of competent
jurisdiction .... -106
Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that FDIC-as-Receiver may
settle "all uninsured and unsecured claims of the receivership with a final
settlement payment which shall constitute full payment and disposition of
the [FDIC's] obligation to such claimants."' 07 The circuit court distin-
guished the statutorily limited obligation of FDIC-as-Receiver to pay credi-
tors only to the extent there are available funds, from the actual assumption
of another's liabilities and concomitant personal liability. 108
The court also rejected FDIC's notion that it gave value merely by per-
forming its statutorily imposed duties.'°9 Addressing itself to policy con-
cerns, the Fifth Circuit observed that "FDIC's special role is not all-
empowering.,," 1 The court pointed out that in the case before it, FDIC-as-
Receiver, as one of many unsecured creditors, was at odds with the trustee
who represented all of the debtor's unsecured creditors. The circuit court
also observed that Congress established FDIC "to protect the nation's bank-
ing system" but also established the "Bankruptcy Code to allocate and ad-
just rights among a debtor's creditors."'I
In conformance with federal decisions on the issue, the Texas Supreme
Court held in Larsen v. FDIC' 1 2 that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration has no right to assert D'Oench Duhme type defenses and their statu-
tory codification for the first time on appeal. "3 The Larsen Trust sold land
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) Federal Deposit Insurance Act, § 2[11](d)(2)(H), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(H) (Supp. III 1991)).
106. Wright, 963 F.2d at 77 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(10)(A) (Supp. III 1991)).
107. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991)). The statutory formula re-
quires that each claim be multiplied by the final settlement payment rate which is the percent-
age rate reflecting an average of the FDIC's receivership recovery experience across all failed
banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(4)(B)(ii) and (iii) (Supp. III 1991).
108, Wright, 963 F.2d at 77.
109. Id. at 78.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. 835 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992).
113. Id. at 74; See D'Oench Duhme v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). The asserted purpose
of the doctrine is protection of FDIC and its assignees from unrecorded side agreements which
are not reflected in a failed financial institution's records. The D'Oench Duhme doctrine has
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for a condominium project and retained a vendor's lien to secure payment of
a $400,000 note. In connection with a refinancing of the project, the condo-
minium project developer convinced Larsen, as trustee, to release a claim
and subordinate the vendor's lien to the deed of trust securing the new con-
struction loan. The mortgage company assigned its note and deed of trust
securing repayment of the note to American Savings Bank.
At trial, Larsen successfully sued the condominium project developer, the
mortgage corporation, and American Savings for fraudulently inducing him
to sign the release and subordination agreement. American Savings per-
fected an appeal of the judgment against it. Thereafter, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board approved a supervisory merger of American Savings into
Citizens Federal Bank. Pursuant to the supervised merger plan, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) approved certain liabili-
ties and purchased certain assets of American Savings, including the note
that was the subject of the Larsen suit.
The court of appeals granted FSLIC's motion to be substituted as appel-
lant, and also granted FSLIC's motion to file an amended brief which raised
the D'Oench Duhme federal defenses and their statutory codification for the
first time. During the pendency of the appeal, FIRREA was enacted by
Congress. 1 4 Because FIRREA abolished FSLIC and effectively replaced it
with FDIC, the Court of Appeals substituted FDIC for FSLIC. The court
then permitted FDIC to further amend the appellate briefs to include FIR-
REA provisions. FDIC asserted that the provisions of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(13)(B) 115 permitted it to assert D'Oench Duhme type defenses for
been codified in FIRREA at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. III 1991), which provides (with "Cor-
poration" referring to FDIC):
(e) Agreements against interests of Corporation - No agreement which tends to
diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it
under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by
purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid
against the Corporation unless such agreement - (1) is in writing, (2) was exe-
cuted by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest
thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of
the asset by the depository institution, (3) was approved by the board of direc-
tors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be
reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4) has been, continu-
ously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository
institution.
Id. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Larsen, "[t]he federal courts have regarded these
statutory provisions as codifications of the D'Oench Duhme doctrine to the extent that they
discuss the common law doctrine and the provisions together." Larsen, 835 S.W.2d at 68 n.3,
(citing Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 90-93 (1987); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1526
n.4 (5th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 598 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991)).
114. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
115. As amended by FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13) (Supp. III 1991), now provides
(with "Corporation" referring to FDIC):
(d)(13) Additional Rights and Duties (A) Prior Final Adjudication - The Corpo-
ration shall abide any final unappealable judgment of any court of competent
jurisdiction which was rendered before the appointment of the Corporation as
conservator or receiver. (B) Rights and Remedies of Conservator or Receiver -
In the event of any appealable judgment, the Corporation as conservator or re-
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the first time on appeal. The court of appeals then concluded that pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), 116 as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court
in Langley v. FDIC,"17 Larsen's claims were barred.
In reversing the Dallas court of appeals,' 1 8 the Texas Supreme Court ob-
served that the appellate court's decision was at odds with several federal
courts' decisions and reviewed those decisions. 119 The Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the "federal appellate decisions are all in agreement: § 1821
does not give the FDIC the absolute new substantive right to assert D'Oench
Duhme - type federal defenses for the first time on appeal."' 20 The court
also relied on Texas procedure, which provides that in the absence of funda-
mental error, a court of appeals has no discretion to reverse a judgment
based on an argument raised for the first time on appeal.12'
D. PERSONAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURE
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the Houston court of
appeals 22 that in an action by a creditor against a debtor for the deficiency
due after disposition of the collateral, the creditor has the burden of pleading
and proving that it disposed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner as required by Section 9.504 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code.' 23 The court noted a split of authority on this issue between Texas
ceiver shall - (i) have all the rights and remedies available to the insured depos-
itory institution (before the appointment of such conservator or receiver) and
the Corporation in its corporate capacity, including removal to Federal court
and all appellate rights; and (ii) not be required to post any bond in order to
pursue such remedies.
116. See note 110, supra.
117. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
118. FDIC v. Larsen, 793 S.W.2d 37, 45 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), rev'd, 835 S.W.2d 66
(Tex. 1992).
119. Larsen, 35 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 825-827; See First Interstate Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 928
F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) (D'Oench Duhme doctrine could not be asserted to protect
solvent bank); Union Federal Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1990) (D'Oench Duhme
doctrine of no use to FDIC where venturer's attempts to base usury claim on pleading conten-
tions were not reflected in lender's records); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989)
(neither D'Oench Duhme doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) afforded protection to FDIC where
judgment had been rendered against bank prior to FDIC's receivership of bank); Olney Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Say. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1989) (D'Oench Duhme doctrine
did not protect FSLIC's rights under an agreement where agreement had been voided by entry
of judgment for rescission prior to FSLIC's conservatorship); Thurman v. FDIC, 889 F.2d
1441 (5th Cir. 1989) (FSLIC not allowed to assert D'Oench Duhme doctrine as a post-judg-
ment intervenor).
120. Larsen, 835 S.W.2d at 74.
121. Id. (citing Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); McCauley v. Consoli-
dated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 477-78, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); TEX. CONST. art. V,
§ 6)).
122. Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l. Bank - Southwest, 795 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1990), affd, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1017 (July 1, 1992), supplemental opinion, 36 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 378 (Dec.22, 1992) (Doggett & Mauzy, J.).
123. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1017 (July 1, 1992). Section 9.504(c) of the Texas Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) provides that "[s]ale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels
and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Vernon 1991).
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courts, as well as other states. 124 In support of placing the burden on the
creditor as an element of its case, rather than on the debtor as an affirmative
defense, the court held that commercially reasonable disposition of the col-
lateral is a condition to a creditor's recovery in a deficiency suit.' 2 5
The Texas Supreme Court observed that the creditor controls disposition
of the collateral and a debtor often has little or no input in such disposition.
As a result, the court concluded that the creditor in a deficiency suit must
plead that disposition of the collateral was reasonable, either specifically or
through a general averment that all conditions precedent have been per-
formed or have occurred. 126 A creditor is then required to prove that dispo-
sition was commercially reasonable only if a debtor specifically denies it in
his answer. 127
In MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, the Texas Supreme Court held that a credi-
tor is liable for any breaches of the peace committed by its independent con-
tractor in carrying out repossession. 128 Because of her default on a note,
MBank El Paso hired El Paso Recovery Service to repossess Yvonne
Sanchez's car. Two individuals hired by El Paso Recovery Service drove to
Sanchez's home with a tow truck and hooked it to the MBank-financed
TransAm. Sanchez intervened and told the men to leave her premises. The
men refused and proceeded with the repossession. Sanchez got into the car,
locked the doors and would not get out. In spite of this, the men towed the
car, with Sanchez inside, to the fenced repossession yard patrolled by a
Doberman guard dog, parked the car inside and padlocked the gate.
Sanchez remained in the locked yard until her husband and the police came
and rescued her.
Sanchez sued MBank for the tortious acts of the towing service. MBank
asserted that the towing service was an independent contractor for which
MBank was not responsible and moved for summary judgment on that
ground. The trial court granted MBank's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and held that Section 9.503 of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code 12 9 imposes a nondelegable duty on
a secured party pursuing nonjudicial repossession to do so without breaching
the peace. 130 MBank argued that although Section 9.503 imposes a duty on
a secured party not to breach the peace, the secured party may delegate that
duty to an independent contractor. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
124. Greathouse, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1018-1019.
125. Id. at 1020, (citing Tannenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.
1982)).
126. Greathouse, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1020.
127. Id.
128. 826 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992).
129. Section 9.503 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides: "Unless
otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done
without breach of the peace or may proceed by action." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.503 (Vernon 1991).
130. Sanchez v. MBank El Paso, 792 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990), aft'd,
836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992).
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court of appeals' rejection of this assertion. 13
In support of its conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the reli-
ance by the court of appeals on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
424, which sets forth an exception to the general rule that an employer or
owner is not liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor. 132 Sec-
tion 424 provides that in spite of this general rule, where the employer is by
statute or administrative regulation under a duty to provide specific safe-
guards for the safety of others, he is liable to the others for whose protection
the duty is imposed for the harm caused by the failure of the contractor
employed by him to provide the required safeguards. 133 The appellate court
also concluded that because there is an inherent danger in nonjudicial repos-
session, the exception to the general rule set forth in Section 427 of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts was also applicable. 134 That section provides that
the employer remains liable where the employer hires an independent con-
tractor to do work involving a special or inherent danger to others. 13
The Texas Supreme Court observed that pursuant to Section 9.503, nonju-
dicial repossession is only one of a secured creditor's alternatives for relief,
the other is judicial action. The court held that if a creditor selects self-help,
he is expected to take precautions to protect "society's interest in the public
peace."' 36
E. REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURE
A foreclosure sale that occurred on the day after the owner of the prop-
erty filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was de-
clared void in Graham v. Pazos de la Torre.137 The court held that upon
filing of the petition, the real property became property of the bankruptcy
estate.' 3 8 As a result, any action to enforce a lien against that property was
stayed by the automatic stay provision of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 139
The appellate court also held that the fact that neither the lienholder nor the
substitute trustee who conducted the foreclosure sale had notice of the bank-
131. 836 S.W.2d at 151.
132. Sanchez, 792 S.W.2d at 531 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 424,
427 (1965)).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 424 (1965).
134. 792 S.W.2d at 531 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 427 (1965)).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 427 (1965).
136. 836 S.W.2d at 154. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cook expressed concern that the
court's decision creates unwarranted strict liability. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1012 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
137. Graham v. Pazos de la Torre, 821 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
writ denied).
138. Id.
139. Graham, 821 S.W.2d at 164. Subsequent to the trial court's ruling on July 3, 1990, the
lienholder and substitute trustee obtained an Order Annulling and Modifying the Automatic
Stay which specifically annulled and retroactively modified the automatic stay in order to vali-
date the March 6, 1990 foreclosure sale. As a result, the lienholder and substitute trustee
attempted to supplement the appellate record with the order. The appeals court refused the
supplementation holding that although the appellate rule allows an appellate record to be sup-
plemented concerning omitted matters, it does not allow creation of a new trial court record.
821 S.W.2d at 165; see discussion of Larsen v. FDIC, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy filing was irrelevant.140
F. USURY
In George A. Fuller Co., Inc. v. Carpet Services, Inc., 141 the Texas Supreme
Court overruled existing case law and held that a pleading containing a de-
mand for usurious prejudgment interest does not make the pleader liable for
statutory usury penalties.' 42 Carpet Services, Inc. was a subcontractor of
the George A. Fuller Company of Texas on a commercial construction pro-
ject. When Fuller did not pay for work performed by Carpet Services, Car-
pet Services sued Fuller for breach of contract. The contract between
Carpet Services and Fuller specified that Carpet Services was not entitled to
payment or interest by Fuller until payment to Fuller by the owner of the
project. In its original petition, Carpet Services pleaded for prejudgment
interest on the contract debt for a period which began prior to the date on
which the owner paid Fuller.
At trial, the court held that the petition of Carpet Services constituted a
usurious charge of interest since it demanded interest before amounts owed
under the contract were due. In its defense, Carpet Services asserted that it
had charged a legal rate of interest, but that the interest claimed was for an
improper period. Texas law holds that any interest charged during a period
when no interest is due is in excess of twice the legal rate of zero. 143 Con-
cluding that the charge was not the result of accident or bona fide error, the
trial court held that Carpet Services must forfeit all principal, interest and
other charges. The court also imposed the statutorily imposed minimum
penalty of $2,000.144
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that a demand for
usurious interest in a pleading is not a usurious charge of interest. 145 Prior
to this ruling by the Dallas court of appeals, Texas courts of appeals, includ-
ing Dallas, had held that a statement made in a pleading could constitute a
usurious charge of interest. 146
In affirming the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court began with the
140. Graham, 821 S.W. 2d at 164. Judge Abel imposed sanctions against an attorney he
concluded had willfully and continuously violated the automatic stay. In re Leaf River Dev.
Corp., Case No. 91-41848-A (Bankr. E.D. Tex., Aug. 4, 1992). There, on behalf of the second
lienholder who had notice of the bankruptcy, the attorney attempted to foreclose real property
owned by a Chapter 11 debtor. After learning of the purported foreclosure, debtor's counsel
asked the attorney to take all actions necessary to undo the attempted foreclosure. The attor-
ney refused.
141. 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
142. Id. at 604.
143. Id.
144. Id. (relying on TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 § 1.06(1), (2) (Vernon 1987)).
145. Carpet Servs., Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 802 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990), afd, 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
146. See Sumrall v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548, 553-54 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1991, no writ); Moore v. White Motor Credit Corp., 708 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Nationwide Fin. Corp. v. English, 604 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
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language of the applicable statute which imposes penalties on "[a]ny person
who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is" greater than a law-
ful amount.14 7  Since the contract did not require usurious interest and no
interest was ever received by Carpet Services, the court focused on the mean-
ing of "charge." Because the statute itself is silent with respect to what con-
stitutes a "charge" of interest, the court examined the legislative history.
The court found that the statement of legislative intent that accompanied the
usury statute contained no indication that the legislature intended for the
usury laws to apply to pleadings. 148
The court also held that a charge must be communicated to the debtor
before it is a charge within the meaning of the usury statute.149 The court
held that a claim for prejudgment interest, which is designed to compensate
a plaintiff for the delay between his injury and recompense for that injury,
arises from the judicial process.' 50 As a result, the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that pleadings demanding usurious prejudgment interest are best
dealt with in the judicial context in which they arise and not through Texas
usury laws. '5 '
In the Fuller opinion, the court makes no reference to Briones v. Solo-
mon,152 where the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the usury statutes
are applicable to demands for postjudgment interest. Presumably, the case is
distinguishable because in Solomon, demands for payment were sent to the
judgment debtor by the attorney for the judgment creditor, thereby consti-
tuting a "charge." But in the Solomon opinion, the court specifically states
147. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 604 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1), (2)
(Vernon 1987)).
148. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 604 (relying on Act of May 23, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 24,
§ 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 609).
149. Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 605.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Gibraltar Say. v. LD Brinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1296 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Fibregrate Corp. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 481 F. Supp.
570, 572 (N.D. Tex. 1979)). In his concurring opinion, Justice Mauzy criticized the court's
conclusion given the facts before it stating that the court's ruling "has no basis in either the
language or the intent of the usury statute; nor is it necessary to the disposition of the case."
Fuller, 823 S.W.2d at 607 (Mauzy, J., Concurring). Subsequent to the opinion of the Dallas
court of appeals, but while the Texas Supreme Court had not yet written or acted upon the
granted writ, the Beaumont court of appeals criticized this analysis stating:
In Texas, creditors have many and varied types of resources to collect debts....
Generally, parties have the choice of selecting the route they wish to pursue to
gain relief. However, whichever route is chosen is only a procedural method to
accomplish a desired result. Demands by a creditor are directed at the debtor,
not the procedural method. A judicial system is only one procedural method to
resolve disputes or seek relief. Thus, we conclude that in the bankruptcy action,
Navistar's demands were on Sumrall, not the bankruptcy court, and that the use
of the judicial system was only a procedural means to an end.
Sumrall v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no writ)
(creditor's filing of stipulation in bankruptcy court containing incorrect information regarding
amounts due on time/price differential contracts constituted demand for payment from debtor,
not merely demand upon court constituting charge of interest within meaning of Texas usury
laws).
152. 842 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1991); see Sander L. Esserman and Cynthia Johnson Rerko,




that "defining 'interest' in that manner [characterizing postjudgment inter-
est as interest subject to the usury statutes] is consistent with this court's
characterization of prejudgment interest as being for the use of money.' 1 53
G. DTPA
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Jefferson Associates' 54 two years after
purchasing an office building in Austin, the purchasers, Jefferson Associates
and F.B. Goldman, discovered that certain fireproofing material used
throughout the building contained asbestos. In the sale contract, Jefferson
and Goldman had expressly agreed that Prudential was selling the facility
"as-is." Alleging that the presence of asbestos significantly reduced the
building's value, Jefferson and Goldman sued Prudential for fraud, negligent
concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act.' 55 The jury concluded that Jefferson and
Goldman sustained actual damages in the amount of $6,023,993.03 and were
also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of $14,300,000.
At trial, Jefferson introduced evidence, including the expert testimony of
an appraiser, that the presence of asbestos materially reduces the value of
any property. Prudential called no expert witness to testify on actual dam-
ages, but many of the Prudential officials who testified stated that it would be
appropriate to discount the value of an asbestos-containing facility.
At trial, plaintiffs introduced no direct evidence that Prudential had ac-
tual knowledge that the building contained asbestos material. Plaintiffs,
however, contended that there was abundant circumstantial evidence from
which the jury could impute such knowledge. Such circumstantial evidence
included Prudential's failure to turn over the plans and specifications for the
building which, if delivered to Jefferson, would have disclosed the use of a
fireproofing material with the trade name of MonoKote, a product which
sometimes contains asbestos. Prudential argued that its failure to deliver the
plans was an innocent mistake without any intent to deceive. The plaintiffs
also put on evidence to establish that Prudential recognized that its asbestos
containing properties were a serious problem and deliberately withheld that
information. 156
153. 842 S.W.2d at 280.
154. 839 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.). Although no writ was filed at the
time of this writing, an application requesting an extension of time to file for writ of error was
filed on November 10, 1992.
155. Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 -17.854 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
156. This evidence also included a 1979 memo prepared by a Prudential corporate head-
quarters employee comparing the economic consequences of asbestos contamination with
those following the outbreak of Legionaire's disease in downtown Philadelphia; a survey by
Prudential of plans and specifications for its buildings in order to determine if any of the
buildings contained asbestos; the fact that when the office of General Services Administration
of the United States Government submitted an asbestos survey questionnaire to Prudential,
Prudential had issued a memo to its leasing and management staff instructing them not to
complete the form; articles about public health hazards related to buildings with asbestos were
circulated at Prudential headquarters with instructions that the articles were not be circulated
outside Prudential; and although a Prudential official had drafted a policy proposal for disclo-
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An asbestos consultant hired by Goldman issued a report which indicated
that the asbestos in the building did not pose a health risk and that the
fireproofing was in very good condition. The report further recommended
adoption of an operations and maintenance program, the total cost of which
was almost $61,000. As a result, Prudential contended that recovery should
be limited to $61,000 - the actual damages incurred by plaintiff.
The appellate court observed that Texas courts recognize two methods to
measure damages for misrepresentation. One is the "out-of-pocket" mea-
sure, which allows an injured party compensation equal to "the difference
between the value of that which he has parted with, and the value of that
which he has received."' 157 The second remedy is known as the "benefit of
the bargain" measure and permits the injured party to recover the difference
between the "value as represented and the actual value received.' 158 The
court of appeals considered that there was factually sufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict on actual damages and refused to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the jury. 159
Prudential also argued that even if it had a duty to disclose the presence of
asbestos in the building that such duty was contractually eliminated under
the "as-is" clause contained in the contract. The appellate court disagreed
and held that actionable fraud or DTPA violations create tort liability irre-
spective of contractual disclaimers and that an "as-is" agreement does not
defeat an action for fraud. 16"
A car buyer successfully sued a used car dealer under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and for violations of the Vehicle Installment Sales Act' 6' in
Villareal v. Elizondo.162 Walter Elizondo purchased a used car from Joe
Villareal in December 1987. Evidence at trial showed that pursuant to nego-
tiations between the parties in Spanish, Villareal agreed that the first car
payment would not be due until January 22, 1987. Elizondo signed a note,
written in English, which provided for biweekly payments of $65.00.
Elizondo's DTPA claim was based on Villareal's representations that the
purchase agreement conferred certain rights and obligations which it did
sure of the existence of asbestos with respect to any building being sold by Prudential, it was
redrafted by the chief lawyer of Prudential's real estate department to delete any reference to
asbestos. In addition, Prudential officials testified that they felt no obligation to share their
knowledge of asbestos dangers with other Prudential employees or potential buyers of Pruden-
tial-owned properties which contained asbestos. Evidence also showed that although Pruden-
tial had the building plans and specifications, when a representative of the purchasers had
asked for the plans and specifications during negotiations, he had been told that none was
available. Prudential, 839 S.W. 2d at 870-71.
157. Prudential, 839 S.W. 2d at 875 (citing George v. Hesse, 100 Tex. 44, 93 S.W. 107
(Tex. 1906)).
158. Prudential, 839 S.W. 2d at 875 (citing Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256, 262 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 603 S.W. 2d 828 (Tex. 1980)).
159. Prudential, 839 S.W. 2d at 875.
160. Id. at 873. In a footnote, however, the court of appeals conceded that "the sale of
property on an "as-is" basis is a long-standing practice that Texas courts have recognized and
enforced." Id. at 873 n. 6.
161. Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 5069-7.01
(Vernon 1987).
162. 831 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
1993] 1207
SMU LAW REVIEW
not, in fact, confer. 163 Specifically, Elizondo testified that the parties had
agreed to postpone the first payment until January 22. Yet Villareal, claim-
ing that Elizondo had missed three payments, repossessed the car on Janu-
ary 20. The appeals court rejected Villareal's assertion that since Elizondo
did not show that the contract was based on mistake or fraud or was ambig-
uous, admission of Elizondo's oral testimony violated the parol evidence
rule. The court held that oral representations are admissible and can serve
as the basis for a DTPA action. 164 The court also upheld Villareal's liability
under the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act because although the trans-
action between Villareal and Elizondo had been conducted in Spanish, Vil-
lareal had never supplied Elizondo with a copy of the written contract in
Spanish. 165
H. MISCELLANEOUS
The Texas Supreme Court, in response to a certified question from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 166 concluded that a
promissory note providing that interest is to be charged at a rate which is
determinable only by reference to a "bank's published prime rate," is a nego-
tiable instrument as defined by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. 167
The court emphasized that when referring to a "bank's published prime
rate" the court included only public rates which are either known or readily
available to the public.168
The Texas Supreme Court held that where summary judgment had been
granted in favor of the guarantor of a promissory note, resjudicata barred a
163. Id. at 478 (citing Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act (DTPA),
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 1987)).
164. Villareal, 831 S.W.2d at 478.
165. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. art. 5069-7.01 (h-1)(v) (Vernon 1987)).
The act does not require that the entire contract be provided in the language in which the
transaction was negotiated, but does require that a copy of the notice set forth in art. 5069-7.01
(h-i) (iv) be provided in the language "primarily used in the oral sales presentation." The
court of appeals also upheld the jury's award of exemplary damages in connection with the
attack on Elizondo by a guard dog on Villareal's premises. Villareal, 831 S.W.2d at 478.
166. Ackerman v. FDIC, 930 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1991), certified question accepted sub nom.,
Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 690 (Tex. 1991).
167. Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. 1992); Ackerman v.
FDIC, 930 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1991), certified question accepted sub nom., Amberboy v. Societe
de Banque Privee, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 690.
168. Amberboy, 831 S.W.2d at 796. In the case in which the certificate was made, Societe
de Banque Privee had purchased investor promissory notes from Vanguard Group Interna-
tional, Inc. The notes had been given in connection with certain individuals' purchase of inter-
ests in an oil and gas limited partnership formed by Vanguard. Societe de Banque Privee sued
the notemakers, asserting that it was a holder in due course. The note makers contended that
the bank was not a holder in due course because the notes were not "negotiable instruments"
as defined by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. Section 3.104(a) of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code provides that for a writing to be a negotiable instrument, it must -
(I) be signed by the maker or drawer; and (2) contain an unconditional promise
or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation
or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this chapter; and
(3) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and (4) be payable to order or to
bearer.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 1968).
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subsequent suit against the same individual for his partnership liability on
the underlying indebtedness.169 George Barr and Ron Knott were partners
in a general partnership called Bar III Venture. In March, 1985, Bar III
executed a promissory note payable to Sunbelt Savings' predecessor in inter-
est. Barr and Knott concurrently executed a personal guaranty of the note.
Subsequent to Bar III's default on the note, Sunbelt filed two separate suits
on the note. In one suit, Sunbelt sued Barr for personal liability because of
his guarantee of the note. In the other suit, Sunbelt sued the partnership as
maker of the note and Knott as guarantor. Barr moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the terms of the guaranty were too uncertain to be
enforceable and the trial court entered a final, take-nothing judgment.
Sunbelt amended its pleadings in the remaining lawsuit and added Barr as
defendant on the basis of his status as a partner. In his answer, Barr asserted
res judicata with his other defenses. Barr then moved for summary judg-
ment asserting that the take-nothing judgment in the first lawsuit barred the
litigation of the claims brought against him in the second lawsuit because
those claims arose out of the subject matter of the first lawsuit and involved
matters which could have been litigated in the first lawsuit. The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. 170 The appellate court based
its holding on its conclusion that the execution of a promissory note and a
guaranty are not a single transaction. Because they were not a single trans-
action, the court held that although Barr had won a take-nothing judgment
in his capacity as a guarantor, res judicata did not preclude a second suit
against Barr in his capacity as a general partner of the obligor on the note. 171
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. 172 In reviewing the doctrine of res judicata, the
court distinguished res judicata, which it referred to as claims preclusion,
from collateral estoppel, which it referred to as issue preclusion.1 73 Relying
on the Restatement of Judgments and the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
with respect to compulsory counterclaims, the court adopted a transactional
approach to res judicata. 74 The court observed that the execution of the
guaranty and promissory note were part of the same transaction, that in
both suits, the bank sought to hold Barr primarily liable, that the amount of
damages sought against Barr in each suit was the same and that the proof
which would be required in each lawsuit was also the same.
On this basis, the court held that there was "no valid reason to subject
Barr to two lawsuits."' 175 The court concluded by holding that a subsequent
suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter as a previous suit
169. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
170. Sunbelt Savings, FSB v. Barr, 824 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991), rev'd
sub nom., Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
171. Id.
172. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 631.
173. Id. at 628.
174. Id. at 629.
175. Id. at 630.
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and could have been litigated in a prior suit.176
176. Id.
